Poetics Of — Imagination

Imagination operates narratively through employment —the synthesis of heterogeneous events (causes, accidents, actions) into a unified plot. Employment is an imaginative act that transforms chronos (mere sequence) into kairos (significant time). When we read a novel, we do not passively receive a sequence; we imaginatively trace the configurational act of the author.

The secondary imagination, by contrast, is poetic—it “dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create.” Here, the poet does not invent ex nihilo but recombines the world’s given elements into new wholes. This is a poetics of reconfiguration : the same act that organizes a perceptual field organizes a stanza. poetics of imagination

Reverie as a distinct imaginative mode—neither dream (unconscious) nor calculation (conscious). Reverie allows the self to become “transparent to its own imagination.” The poetics of imagination is therefore a practice of receptivity : the poet lends words to the image’s own force. Reverie allows the self to become “transparent to

| Principle | Description | Example | |-----------|-------------|---------| | | Imagination operates via tropes (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche) that transfer properties across domains. | “The sun kissed the sea” – personification. | | Configurational synthesis | Imagination integrates disparate elements into coherent wholes (images, plots, schemas). | The four seasons as a narrative of birth–death–rebirth. | | Negativity | Imagination works through absence: to imagine X is to hold X as non-present yet present-as-if. | Mental imagery of a deceased loved one. | | World-disclosure | Poetic imagination opens alternative modes of being-in-the-world, often by defamiliarizing the habitual. | Kafka’s Metamorphosis disclosing alienated labor. | | For Ricoeur

For Ricoeur, a live metaphor does not simply replace a literal term; it creates a semantic impertinence that forces us to restructure semantic fields. “Time is a beggar” (Rilke) is not a substitution but a new predication. Imagination is the operation of grasping this new resemblance in the absence of literal similarity.

Kendall Walton’s Mimesis as Make-Believe (1990) offers a complementary analytic framework: fictions are props in games of make-believe. When we read “the monster lurks,” we imagine that a proposition is true in the fictional world. Imagination here is rule-governed, social, and quasi-perceptual. Walton dissolves the classic binary of real vs. unreal, replacing it with degrees of participation in generated worlds.